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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- E:~;:tensio11s of Remr1rks

Oclobcr ! .,', 1 !Ju9

DANGERS OF INVOLVEMENT IN
ASIA

'

There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follow&:
1From the Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 28,
1969!
MAJORITY LEADER MANSFIF.LD WARMS UNITED
STATES ABOUT FURTHER INVOLVEMENT IN

AsiA
(By Wllllam D . Jam€6)
A warning Sen. Mike Mansfield made last

week that a deeper U .S. Involvement in Laos
could develop Into a VIetnam-style military
entanglement Ia drawing na.tlona.l a.nd International attention because or the acc uracy or his grim predictions about the course
ot the Vietnam war.
The Senate Majority Leader based his
warning about Laos on a trip he ma.de to
Southeast Asia In Augus t at the request or
Precldent Nixon.
The trip was b ls sixth !act-finding trip to
Southeast Asia In the last 16 years. He made
such trips in 1953, 1954, 1955, 1962, 1965 and
1969.

Mansfield, who J:u\8 investigated condltlons
In Asia. a.t the request or Presidents R.oooevelt, Truman, Elaenhow&e, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, liM been consistent in warnings that t.he U.S. should a.v01d gettlng lured
into the quicksand o! Asl:i!otlc wars.
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'file Montana senator bas been lauded treq\Mlltly by national oorreapoDdente for analy.lng Vletna.m evenia ~. Clayton
l"r$W!!e;y. MUouliJ~ted eolumn!A1,
compll~ M,...cl
J'lla1' for beUJI
"tiM one I:Q&A, Co tNin ihe lleelnnlng, hM
been. uncCl.llnil:r rliJ:bt ~ut U.S. luvol've-ment In vtotllt.m .~
ltlter hrl'MtlJ1tilng cllOOitioDII In I.rldochi:DII In 1M3; wbeo Uloe Jl'noe'.b wwe ctut
tl.lbii~. ~ ncoc:Dl!lllelllded tbat ~be
'(1 .8. ahou'kt UnFOY8 l.ia V'lfln~ prog,:ama.
N~nr that tbeA ...... IJIIeillodmc a.bou\
tU milliOn a year t~ b6 ~ that
tbe aim o( our progJ'1lmS sbould. be to build
up the selr-reliv.noe of tbe people.
illlm.etlellt 11M mainlalned CODsistent!y
su-e 11163 11111t 1t w01111d be better to bave i.be
ao.tlllee.s& .AIIIIaD8 I!Ghre &heir own pn>blems
w.- to ha'M U.S. mUiiar)' fo...:. tlnolnd.
''The at~ tn Vletaam aDd. m a larpr
&en.M. ln. Ind•hlna, Is. grim aacS dl&eouragln&" he reported after his 19M vt.t.lt. (On
that trip, he alSo attencted the conference ot
the Southeast Asia Treaty Orpnl~t!Qil
(8BATO) 1n tb.e P.ll.llfpplneflat tbe request of
Prell4en.t :hlenbows.)
..u · WOUld be mt.s~ an<! t'IJii.J.e," he
lUPoid 1D. )Lis 1~ report. t4 tell tllle Senate or
ihe people {)l the U.S. thU. COillllUOAons we.-e
otlar than ~U1In and. <U&cow&Pni:.
~need, he ~lafne4. "Is not to bury the
realltt• at thfs anua~Qil but tO race them.
howe'fW p1m jlllld dtllcew'I'C,inc they may be.
I! ..,. do - , lt. Ill poatb.., that Ule revenal
wlllab baa ~ ~ tn IDCiochlna may
y!~ ~ Wbl.ch bu. a)IIIUca*lon el.se-

*'*

w~lnAaa."

"Tbls. expeclence coulQ be uae!Ql 1D avoU1~
Ins attn other eetl:lecu aDd d&magln.IJ: wute
ot utold mllUons or dolla.rs or tbe resources
ot tbe citizens of ihe u.s..• he said..
:wau.aeld pOllltecl out !D 1964, when dis~
cUMtug the :Pftneh c1~a& ln TtMilam, tbat
there had been a ee•en.l wncteDCy to "make
tM Ph faiaM to the. ~· and conal.st,antly atl4 sel'lousllJ undereliUmate the
stt~th" at the. !Ol'cea iit)l.t.lng ~e Fren.ch.
"lt' there WIE one overrid.lng. cause o! the
falllz.r&, howe¥er,~ he said, "It l.s to be found
In ibe dlaturle4 emphule gnoen to Ule capecu:r of m!.Ut9.!'1 ~r.- alone to brulg about
anendtatu~~~~lnindo~

cllllla..''
l&!d It would be <Umcult to see what
mAM Ule U.S. coulQ have. done to avert a
Oal):ununlst v.tctory over the Fl:enoh, "short o!
~ foolhardy eommltment ot American
troop& O!l tbe Aalan malllland. •
.-ner a 1iilt to Vleill- ln 1155, Mans11.etle
~ u.e need to encowoqe
tHe V:letnameM to \ake ~ o1 their own
alfalra.
''What Is at. stake IS the active loyalty of
the IJreponcterance of the population or
Bolltb Vietmlm. '!'hat can ))e won and held
only by a ~ coveroment which
ak:Cie ean ~ aDd respoDd to the

a.

-cau.

n..- ot the peop~e. ·•

Mansfield urged the U.S to c()I}COtntrate on
helping with economic n~~very and development programs. He said that ought to be
done with a view to creating over a aet
per1od of time a seU-suaialnlog Vietnam free
from fUrther d.lreet reliance an U.S. assistance.
After visiting VIetnam In 1962, Manstleld
expre8Sed serious doubt& about U.S. policies
there. Be said there were about 12,000 Americans there a;nd that U.S. spending totaled
hundred& or mU!IoM annually there.
"lt would " a dlsserYioe to my country
not to voice a deep concern over the trend or
events. stnce my las\ 111&1t,- he aald In h!s
1962 J:eport.
1\ was aeven years and U billion or U.S.
aid later but yet, substantially, the same dl!11.culttes rematned U, Indeed, they have not
been 90mpound~. he reponed.
Be a~ Jeus. about. having the U.S.
l~y IJIJPPM'\ Of ~ Yleinam- armed
toro~~~~.

"Th.ls lntensUicatlon, however, Inevitably

has. carried us to the start ot the road which
leads to ihe petnt at whl.oh conflict In Vtetnn.m could ~ of ~ier concern and
greater responsibility to tbe U .S. than It Is
to the goverlllli1'8ni and people 0: South V1ctnrun,.~ he said.
"1~ p1·eaent clJcumstances," he cautioned,
"purS\lit or that courae could lnyolve an expendtture of Amertcan lives II.Ild r-.urces on
a scale which would bea.r II ttle relationship
to Ul* l.uteresta ot the U.S., or, Indeed, to the
Interests of the people of VIetnam."
To avoid that course, he asserted, It should
be clear to ourselves as well a.s to the VIetnamese where the primary responsibility was
In thiS sl tuatlon:
"It must rest, as It has rested, v•lth the
VIetnamese government and people."
concerned wlth the posslbU!ty that the
war would be converted. Into an American
one, fought primarily with American lives,
he said:
"It should be noted In all frankness that
our own bureaucratic tendencies to act In
uniform and enlarging patterns )lave resulted
In an expansion ot the U.S. commitment In
some places to an extent which would appear to bear only the remotest relationship
to what Is essential or even desirable In
terms or U.S. Interests."
Mansfield and cODgresslonal colleagues who
accompanied him em the 1962 trip agreed
that the u.s. should! make a thorough reassessment of Ita. lll!<:urity requirements.
Such security requlnments could be met,
they Indicated, without any further extension or the U.S. commitment In Southeast
Asia.
Pointing out the perilS of having the U.S.
assume too strong a role In Southeast Asiatic policies, Mansneld said In his 1962 report:
"It Is doubtful that It Is the best way ln
any southeast Asian na.tlo~. li the responsibility for Its Independent survival were to
come to rest more heavily with the U.S. than
with Indigenous leadership because of the
failure or Inadequacies of that leadership In
meeting Its own responsibilities to Its people."
The Montana senator's warning of the
"open-end danger or an expa.ndtng war" received worldwide attention following his 1965
trip to Southeast Asta.
,
Mansfield was pessimistic about chances
for an early end of the war-In sharp oontrast to optimistic views of top U.S. mll1tary
and elvillan omclals.
"A rapid solution to the conflict Ln VIetnam Is not In Immediate prosped," he
cautioned.
Ma.rl-'field contended that despl te the great
lru::rease In American military commitment, tt
was doubtful, In view or the acceleration ot
VIet Cong ellocta, tha.t the Saigon government's poeltlon could be held without more
U.S. forces.
He said there was no assurance a.s to what
ultimate Increase In U .S. military forces
would be required.
The question, he said, was not one or applying Increased U.S. preasure to a defined
rnUltary situation, but Tather of "pressing
against a rnllltary sltuat.on which Is, In effect, open-ended.
"How open IS dependent on the extent to
which North VIetnam and Its supporters are
willing and able to meet lncrl'nsed force by
Increased force," he said.
The senator's "open-ended" warnlug was
dlscUSI!ed frequently In the next three years
as the U.S. saw Its military !orces In VIetnam grow to 560,000 and !a.talltles go over·
the 30,000 mark.
At the conclusion of his trip In August.
Mansfield recommended to President Nixon
that the U.S. place an Immediate ban on
lncrea8e6 In U.S. personnel In Southeast Asia,
In a report to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, or wtllch he Is one of the rankIng memben, Mansfield noied that our Involvement In Laos already has cost hundreds
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of millions or dollars and hundred• of lin".
The Involvement In Laos ca.rrtes the 'tht·c~&
or even a deeper commitment by tht- u s .
he said.
Congresslon&J colleague" or Mnnstlehl. 1\ho
rf'gl\fd him us thelr let\dln& authority '"'
Southeast A•lu, have been lmpres"t>d by Uw
nectu·acy or hls scholarly rep<>rts after Pach
or his fa.ct -finding trips. Many or his Sen at<'
friends say It IS trag)c thnt hls advtce and
warnings were Ignored.
The record shows clearly that Mansfield was
correct In his grim warnings about the
dangers or a growing U.S. lnvolvt>ment ln
VIetnam.
The senator now Is warnlng the nation ,r
what might develop I! the U .S. mak~ the
same rn!Btakes In Laoe It did In VieLnnm
OvERLY OPTIMISTIC V'IETNAM. QoorA'flONS

(Eorroa's NO'l'E. -There have been so many
optimistic statements about the VIetnam
war that Phlllp Oeyelln, editorial page ctilLor
o! the Washlng,ton Poat, made a collection
of them. Oeyelln published hls Ust In the
summer after Defense Secretary Laird declared, "We have certainly turned the corner
in the war."
(Since. then. he probably haa added a comment by President Nixon. The President described the war a.s possibly "one or America •s
finest hours, because we took a dl!!lcult task
and we succeeded."
(We are reprinting the article to show the
difference In views between the men quoted
by Oeyelln and those of Sen. Mike Mansfield
appearing on this page.)
"We have never been In a better relative
posltlon."--General Westmoreland , April 10,
1968.
"We have reached an Important point
when the end begins to come Into view. . . .
The enemy has many problems: He Is losing
control o! the scattered population under
hls Influence . . . He sees the strength of
his forces steadily d eclining . . . Hls monsoon offensives have been !allures. He was
dealt a mortal blow by the Installation of a
freely elected representative government
. . . the enemy's hopes are bankrupt."General Westmoreland, Nov. 21, 1967.
"We are generally pleased . . . we are ,·ery
sure we are on the right track''-Presldent
Johnson, July 13, 1967.
"Progress has been mode . . Wr have
pushed the enemy farther and farther In to
the jungles . . . We have succeeded In attaining our objectlves,"--General WE'stmoreland, July 13. 1967.
" I expect the . . war to achieve vNy sensational results In 1967."-Aml>:l,..,tdor Lo<i g~.
Jan. 9, 1967.
"We are beginning to see ""me s igns oC
success . . . There Is an erosion o! (enemy 1
morale."-Secretary or State Rusk, Aug 25.
1966.
"We have stopped losing the war."-Secrrtary of Defense McNamara , October, 1965.
"We are not about to senrt Amer ican boys
nine or ten thousn!1d mliPs from hOmE' to tlo
what Asian boys ought to be doing for tb0mselves."-Presldent Johnson. Oct. 21, 1964.
"The war In Yietnam Is on thr rlgt:t
track."-AmbRssador Lodge, June 30. 1964
"I thin'< the number lof U.S. personnel) \n
VIetnam lS not likely to Increase su bstantl<~l
ly ''-Secretary of DefensE' ll'cNnm.·u.l, !lh y
i4, 1964.
"The VIetnamese . . . themselves c 111
handle thls problem with thei r own effort ..._
Secretary of State nusk. F~l). 2'4, 1964.
"The United States stili hopes to wlthdrE<w
Its troops from Sou th V!Hnam by tbe Pn'l
of 1965."-Secreto.t·y of DefeN>e Mt:-!Rinnm,
Feb. 19, 1964.
" I am h opeful we can bring b1wk nrltli Uonal . . . men . . . because r pcrf!.mal!y
believe this Is a war the VIetnamese must
fight. "I don't believe we can take on th~ t
combat task for them "-secretary of Defense McNamara, Feb. 3. 1964.
"VIctory ... Is just months away, and the
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reductiOn ot American advisors can begln
any tl.me now . . . I can safely say the end
of the W&r Ia In slght."--Gen. Paul D.
Marltlns, commander of the Mll1tary Assistance Command 1n S&lgon, Oct. 31. 1963.
"Seoretary McNamara and Oen. (Maxwell)
Taylor reported their Judi'ment that the
major part of the U .s . m.IUtary task can be
oomplet.d by the end of 1966 .. ."-White
Hou.ae statement, Oct. ~. 1963.
"I t.el we ahall I<Chltve victory In 1964."Tram Van Don&, Eouth VIetnamese gen~ral,
Oot. l,

1~ .

"South VIetnam Ia on Its way to victory ... "-Frederlc.lt 1!:. Nolttni', U.S . ambasll&dor to South VIetnam, June 12, 1963.
"The South VIetnamese themBelves are
lilhtln& their own battle, ft&htlng well."Secret&ry of St.te Rusk, April, 1963.
"(The strunle) Is turnlni' an Important
OOI'ner."--8ecretary of Sta.te Rusk, March 8,
1963.
"The oorner has definitely been turned towaro Tlctory 1n South Vletnam."-Arthur
Sylv..tc, AM!stant Secret&ry of Defense,
l4areh 8, 1963.
"'~'here are deftn.ltely encoura.glng elements
•.. the n.tt.o of casualties ... lndlcatee some
tUl'DUaJ In the mtuatl.on."-.secretary or
State ltuak, Feb. 1, 1963.
"The ,.r 1n Vtetnam Is goinr; well and will
aucceec1."--Becretary McNamara, Jan. 81,
19t3.
"The South VIetnamese should achieve
Tlctory 1n three years ... I am conftdent the
Vletnam.eae are 101n1 to win the war. (The
VIet Con&) f - Inevitable deteat."-Adm.
Harry D . Felt, U .S. Commander-In-Chief of
Paclll.c Porces, Jan. 12, 1963.
"Jrvery quantl.tatlve measurement shows
ws're wlnnlng the w&r . . . U.S. aid to VIetnam
hu reached a peak and will start to level
otf."~tary ot Defense McNa.me.ra, 1962.
"Tbe Communtata now realize they can
never conquer tree Vletruun."--Gen. J . W.
Dante!, o111.olal military aide to VIetnam,
Jan. 8, 19el.
"The American aid prognun In VIetnam has
proved an enormous success, one of the
m.a}cx \'t.otortea of American policy
o.n. J. w. Daniel, omclal mlllte.ry aide to
VIetnam, Sept. 7, 1900.

Octobe1· J .J, 1 !JG.<J

